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Abstract: 
In this paper, we examine the extent to which host country income 
inequality influences multinational enterprises' (MNEs) expansion strategy 
for foreign production investment, depending on their specific strategic 
objectives. Applying a transaction cost framework, we predict that national 
income inequality has an inverted U-shaped relationship with foreign 
production investment. As inequality increases, MNEs accrue lower 
transaction costs arising from interactions with various local actors, leading 
to higher probability of investment. As income inequality increases further, 
its effect on location attractiveness will become negative, as its attraction 
effect is increasingly offset by additional monitoring, bargaining and 
security costs owing to the more fractious nature of high inequality 
societies. In addition, we suggest that the impact of income inequality is 
contingent on investment objectives: the inverted U-shaped relationship is 
stronger for efficiency-seeking investment but weaker for market-seeking 
and competence-enhancing investments. We find substantial support for 
our hypotheses through an analysis of 27 years (1986-2012) of data on 
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Scholars have undertaken important steps toward understanding the causes and 
consequences of income inequality – the distribution of income within a given population – 
through the lenses of business, government, and societal interaction (Beal & Astakhova, 2017; 
Marens, 2018; Riaz, 2015). Inequality research, with its roots in sociology and political science, 
has revealed several negative impacts that income inequality has on individual and societal 
wellbeing (Neckerman & Torche, 2007). More recently, the relationship between inequality and 
organizational form, behavior, and survival has entered this discussion (Bapuji & Neville, 2015; 
Elmes, 2018; Wang, Zhao, & Thornhill, 2015). To further this discussion, we study the extent to 
which the anticipated costs of dealing with varying levels of inequality affect the likelihood that 
a location will be selected for investment by foreign firms. 
Influenced by cultural norms, labor market conditions, and political forces, firms’ wage-
setting practices contribute to a nation’s degree of national income inequality (Bapuji, Husted, 
Lu, & Mir, 2018). Organizational forms spawned by specific institutional configurations (e.g. 
public corporations) can in turn reinforce existing inequality (Davis, 2017; Pathak & 
Muralidharan, 2018). On the other hand, rising income inequality can trigger a variety of social 
movements that increase policy risks, thereby challenging firms’ legitimacy and operational 
success (Bapuji & Neville, 2015; Reinecke, 2018). Our study builds upon this discussion through 
a theoretical and empirical examination of how multinational enterprises (MNEs) respond to host 
country income inequality while making major decisions about the internationalization of 
production investments. 
Our study examines organizational response to inequality within the context of two core 
multinational business decisions: 1) How does national income inequality influence MNEs’ 
choice among potential locations for offshore production? and 2) How do MNE investment 



































































objectives (namely efficiency-seeking, market-seeking, or competence-enhancing) affect the 
degree of influence that income inequality has on location choice? Income inequality refers here 
to unevenness in the distribution of financial resources, primarily wage and household income, 
among a country’s members (Ahlquist, 2017).  
We argue that income inequality has both positive and negative implications for the MNE 
and that these vary by both the degree of inequality and the MNE’s investment objective. 
Existing research has focused on the negative impacts of income inequality on individual 
wellbeing and societal functioning (Neckerman & Torche, 2007; Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015). 
For example, income inequality has been found to inhibit human development (Pickett & 
Wilkinson, 2007, 2015), damage trust (Uslaner & Brown, 2005), increase socio-political 
instability (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Oishi & Kesebir, 2015), and contribute to political violence 
and crime (Jayadev & Bowles, 2006; Keefer & Knack, 2002). Conducting business in these 
fractious environments increases risk to firms, which, in turn, increases operating costs (Henisz, 
2000).  
While mitigating the threats arising from inequality could be costly, as inequality 
increases MNEs may also benefit from reduced need to bargain with unions, the state, and other 
civil society organizations (CSOs) (Beramendi & Rueda, 2014; Kourula & Laasonen, 2010). 
They also retain greater flexibility in using performance-based financial incentives (Katic & 
Ingram, 2018; Simpson, 2009). Therefore, increasing levels of inequality can result in a more 
attractive location for MNE investment. However, at higher levels of inequality, the added costs 
associated with political instability, damaged trust, and reduced access to education and health 
care offset the benefits of labor productivity and pay differences. We thus propose an inverted U-



































































shaped relationship in which location attractiveness increases with inequality at lower levels but 
decreases with higher levels of inequality.  
We predict that the magnitude of benefits and costs attributable to income inequality will 
vary according to MNEs’ economic objectives for a particular investment (Cantwell & 
Mudambi, 2005; Dunning, 2000). We argue that the relationship between a host country’s 
income inequality and an MNE’s location choice will be stronger in the case of an efficiency-
seeking investment, and weaker in the case of market-seeking and competence-enhancing 
investments. To test our predictions, we used data on foreign subsidiaries established by 
Japanese firms, and we find robust empirical evidence supporting our hypotheses. Our sample 
includes nearly all production subsidiaries established by Japanese parent firms between 1986 
and 2012, where information on investment motive was available. Japanese MNEs have been 
found to be a suitable basis for a great number of studies on internationalization and corporate 
strategy (Delios & Henisz, 2003; Head, Ries, & Swenson, 1995; Hennart & Park, 1994). 
Understanding how national income inequality impacts international expansion decisions 
is essential to further examining the extent to which MNEs, the state, CSOs, and domestic 
competitors directly or indirectly influence income inequality (Audebrand & Barros, 2018; 
Marens, 2018). International business scholars have also emphasized that MNEs exercise 
strategic discretion when expanding overseas (Hutzschenreuter, Pedersen, & Volberda, 2007; 
Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, forthcoming). Though income inequality is a relevant location 
attribute, the current literature offers limited guidance on how to address the case of the MNE 
that, by definition, operates in more than one society. We therefore aim in this article to 
contribute to the growing discussion on the relationship between inequality and the behavior of 
business, especially MNEs (Beal & Astakhova, 2017; Neckerman & Torche, 2007). We combine 



































































the many findings from research on the institutional (i.e. government, civil society, and business) 
antecedents and consequences of income inequality (Bapuji, 2015), emphasizing organizations as 
cost-economizing institutions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985). As foreign direct investment 
(FDI) involves substantial financial commitments, and produces long-term and far-reaching 
consequences for the MNE’s financial performance, social legitimacy, and survival (de Lange, 
Armanios, Delgado-Ceballos, & Sandhu, 2015), we view location choice as an appropriate 
context in which to investigate the revealed preferences of MNEs towards varying levels of 
income inequality.  
Our study is motivated by the need to understand firms’ decisions and strategic responses 
to income inequality. As stated by Bapuji (2015): “…organizational practitioners need to 
understand how inequality shapes their choices related to management and strategies” (p. 1060). 
In answer to another call (Marens, 2018), we shed light on how inequality impacts managerial 
decisions, combining perspectives from international business research with business and society 
scholarship. We thus provide both a unique empirical study and a novel perspective on business 
and inequality research, by demonstrating the existence of a type of institutional arbitrage that 
maximizes the economic benefits of multinationalism while reducing frictions in rent extraction 
caused by local inequality. While a host of factors are involved in these location decisions, the 
extent to which MNEs vote for locations through provisioning large capital investments has the 
potential to shape not only their own functioning, but also the societies in which they invest. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Research on inequality predominantly focuses on its institutional antecedents and consequences 
(Bapuji & Neville, 2015; Davis, 2017; Wadhwani, 2018). There are clear implications for 



































































inequality stemming from the existence and strength of labor unions, government regulation of 
wages and working conditions, centralization of wage bargaining, and hiring and layoff policies 
(Greckhamer, 2016; Wolff, 2015). These formal institutions affect the degree of inequality 
within their respective realms of influence, but are also subject to pressures for change, in part 
driven by the evolving trends in inequality. High and/or rising inequality erodes society-
regulating institutions consisting of trust, norms of cooperation, and civic responsibility (Amis, 
Munir, & Mair, 2017; Khan, Munir, & Willmott, 2007). Inequality and institutional change thus 
appear to be endogenous, co-evolutionary processes (Alamgir & Cairns, 2015; Beramendi & 
Rueda, 2014). 
Pressures for institutional change operate through CSOs, political processes, protest 
movements, business lobbying, and other more radical manifestations of socio-political 
instability, including crime and political violence (Jayadev & Bowles, 2006; Rodrik, 1999; 
Shrivastava & Ivanova, 2015). While research has mainly considered firms to be exogenous to 
the co-evolution of institutions and inequality, they are nonetheless primary providers of income 
(Neckerman & Torche, 2007). There is evidence that the division of proceeds between owners of 
capital and employees responds, systematically, to institutional conditions (Cobb, 2016). The 
MNE is unique in its response to institutions, because it operates within a host of institutional 
environments and contributes to the international division of labor. International business 
research has established that the location of different value chain activities responds, in part, to 
the quality of the institutional environment, including the degree of political risk and corruption, 
and the social and infrastructure services provided by the state (Henisz, 2000, 2002; Hennart, 
2009). Hence, MNEs have an opportunity to engage in institutional arbitrage, namely relocating 
and internalizing value chain segments depending on host country institutions, to maximize 



































































aggregate economic efficiency, global competitiveness, and ultimately return on investment 
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008).  
The economic benefits accruing to the MNE, through internationalization, are to varying 
degrees offset by the incremental costs arising from frequent and complex interactions with labor 
unions, the state, buyers, suppliers, and CSOs (Cooke, 1997, 2001; Guo, Xu, & Jacobs, 2014; 
Kourula & Laasonen, 2010). Some of these costs (e.g. contract negotiation, monitoring, and 
enforcement costs) are incurred to mitigate ex-post opportunistic behaviors by transacting parties 
and have been well documented by international business scholars (Hennart, 1991). MNEs’ 
foreign production investments are vulnerable to ex-post hold-up by the state and other 
stakeholders, due to long investment horizons and immobility of the assets invested (Jensen, 
2006). MNEs incur substantial costs (e.g. complex contracts, renegotiation, lobbying) to mitigate 
hold-up threats and therefore tend to favor locations where these threats are lower (Oetzel, 2005). 
In the following, we consider the transaction cost implication of low and high inequality 
locations for production investment. 
 
Low Inequality and Location Attractiveness  
Economic coordination legislation enables a variety of labor and business stakeholders to 
participate in establishing wages, benefits, and working conditions. This coordination is more 
pervasive in countries that, historically, have had lower income inequality (Beramendi & Rueda, 
2014). This is because in countries with higher inequality, high wage earners are less likely to 
support centralized economic coordination, as their existing economic privileges are at stake, and 
they typically have greater influence over political processes than lower income earners 
(Uslaner, 2008). Hence, the centralization of negotiating wage and working conditions is more 



































































likely to gain traction among corporations in low inequality societies (Beramendi & Rueda, 
2014). The threat of centralized economic coordination stems, in part, from the ability of workers 
to strike as a tactic in bargaining for higher wages. It also allows employees to engage 
collectively with the government to increase minimum wages, employment protections, and 
public benefits, which in turn are paid for through income and corporate taxes (Ahlquist, 2017; 
Western & Rosenfeld, 2011).  
Furthermore, low inequality societies are generally more tolerant of social unrest, which 
enables social movements to influence individuals’ perceptions of their upward economic 
mobility (Shariff, Wiwad, & Aknin, 2016). Cooperation among domestic firms is often 
legitimized by the demands of these social movements (Audebrand & Barros, 2018), which, in 
turn, makes domestic industry more competitive against corporate interests and foreign entry 
(Audebrand & Barros, 2018). Therefore, an institutional environment with low inequality implies 
the additional costs of engaging with domestic firms and institutional proponents of improved 
labor conditions and compensation. Negotiations will take longer, will be costlier, and will 
reduce the discretion of firms to adjust levels of employment (e.g. through layoffs, or temporary 
or part-time employment) and limit the range of options for providing performance-based 
incentives. Hence, as inequality increases, the economizing opportunities of the production 
subsidiary also increase.  
 
High Inequality and Location Attractiveness 
A growing body of literature suggests that high inequality stifles economic growth (Alesina & 
Perotti, 1996) and diminishes health across the income spectrum (Pickett & Wilkinson, 2015), 
resulting in increased workplace absenteeism (Andrews & Htun, 2018). High inequality also 



































































limits access to education and health care, thereby entrenching inequality across multiple 
generations (OECD, 2015; Ostry, Berg, & Tsangarides, 2014; Pickett & Wilkinson, 2007). In 
addition, high inequality dampens trust and norms of civic cooperation (Uslaner & Brown, 
2005). Since the efficiency of firms is impacted by the institutions that underpin economic 
activity and prosperity (North, 1987), the erosion of the institutional environment resulting from 
high inequality will reduce the efficiency of collecting payments, negotiating and reinforcing 
contracts, and monitoring employees and business partners. High inequality thus leads to higher 
contracting and operating costs for the MNE and increases expropriation risk, ultimately 
decreasing location attractiveness (2002; Knack & Keefer, 1997).  
Instability produced by higher inequality may manifest in overt political actions 
including, in extreme cases, violence (Keefer & Knack, 2002; Oetzel, 2005). Political unrest and 
violence reduce the functioning of the formal institutions of the state, creating threats to the 
security of property and persons. Lower levels of trust in high inequality societies can also 
increase vandalism and violent crimes (Fowles & Merva, 1996; Jayadev & Bowles, 2006). 
MNEs are primary targets of these crimes because they are often viewed as perpetrators of 
inequality through alignment with the state and outcompeting local firms (Shrivastava & 
Ivanova, 2015). This fractious environment increases operating costs for the MNE, through 
additional monitoring and security expenditures to protect property and personnel (Rivera-
Santos, Rufin, & Kolk, 2012). The World Bank’s “Enterprise Survey” reveals that “crime, theft 
and disorder” are widely cited threats to firms in the highest inequality countries (World Bank 
Group, 2018).  
In summary, low inequality environments represent increased MNE operating costs due 
to the higher degree and/or threat of more centralized economic coordination, increased domestic 



































































competition, and meeting the demands of CSOs. Hence, at low levels of inequality, the 
relationship between inequality and location attractiveness is positive, but we predict that the 
relationship reaches an inflection point at much higher levels of inequality. Beyond this 
inflection point, the added costs associated with political instability, damaged trust, and norms of 
civic cooperation begin to reduce location attractiveness. Based on our arguments that low and 
high levels of income inequality produce opposite effects on location attractiveness, we posit:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between a host country’s income inequality and 
the probability of MNE production entry into that country is an inverted U-shape. 
 
Contingent Effects of Investment Objectives 
MNEs’ investment objectives influence how host countries’ location advantages and 
disadvantages are evaluated (Hakkala et al., 2008; Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). For instance, 
although a host country’s political instability makes foreign investments less likely, the extent of 
the negative relationship between this and other factors (e.g., economic coordination, trust, 
cooperation) and location attractiveness is contingent on the objective of a specific investment 
(Brouthers, Gao, & McNicol, 2008; Hakkala et al., 2008). We likewise argue that the degree to 
which income inequality influences location choice will depend upon the investment objective. 
These contingent effects alter the costs of income inequality when interacting with workers, 
buyers, suppliers, government regulators, or CSOs. Where these interactions are of greater 
consequence to the economic objectives of a firm, the institutional environment should have a 
stronger effect on location attractiveness. We focus on three well-established investment 



































































objectives: efficiency-seeking, market-seeking, and competence-enhancing (Cantwell & 
Mudambi, 2005).  
Efficiency-seeking objective. One of the primary motivations for offshoring production is 
to increase efficiency through the division of labor and/or economies of scale (Dunning, 2000). 
While controlling cost is important in all types of overseas investments, efficiency-seeking 
investment especially focuses on reducing costs through increased labor productivity and/or 
reduced labor cost. As we will argue in subsequent sections, cost reduction is not necessarily a 
primary aim for competency-enhancing and market-seeking investments, for which the 
availability of skilled labor, political instability, and trust levels in society are more relevant.  
Prior research shows that rising wage levels and worker protections motivate decisions to 
offshore production (Cooke, 2001; Harrison & McMillan, 2006). In lower inequality societies, 
where centralized bargaining is more prevalent, CSOs representing the interests of employees, 
customers, environmental protection, product and production standards, and so forth all tend to 
have more influence and a greater ability to both voice their concern and have their concerns 
addressed (Uslaner & Brown, 2005). As inequality increases, the threat of centralized bargaining 
and the influence of CSOs and other stakeholders diminish (Beramendi & Rueda, 2014). Thus, a 
production subsidiary has more leverage in setting wages according to the MNE’s priorities. In 
the absence of more stringent worker protection policies, MNEs can more easily adjust wages 
and levels of employment in response to fluctuations in global demand. Therefore, the 
production subsidiary’s cost-economizing opportunities arise from increased inequality and the 
accompanying reduced need both for economic coordination and to respond to CSOs’ concerns, 
thereby creating a more conducive environment for the MNE to implement cost reduction in 
production subsidiaries.  



































































Since cost economizing is a higher priority for efficiency-seeking subsidiaries than for 
competence- and market-seeking subsidiaries, even though the former will still be forced to cope 
with the heightened socio-political instability associated with high inequality, the increase in 
location attractiveness will be more pronounced. In other words, the inverted U-shape 
relationship proposed in H1 will exhibit a sharper ascent in location attractiveness as inequality 
increases, culminating in a higher inflection point. Thus, we expect a stronger inverted U-shaped 
relationship between income inequality and production entry in the case of efficiency-seeking 
subsidiaries, and posit:  
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between a host country’s income inequality and 
the probability of MNE production entry will strengthen when the new subsidiary 
has an efficiency-seeking mandate. 
 
Competence-enhancing objective. Foreign subsidiaries are increasingly established to 
contribute to new value creation through product and technological development (Demirbag & 
Glaister, 2010). While cost economizing is the main driver of efficiency-seeking production 
investments, these competency-enhancing investments require the most suitable human resource 
qualities. Unlike an efficiency- or market-seeking mandate, these investments are focused on 
enhancing the MNE’s competencies, rather than exploiting them (Cantwell & Mudambi, 2005). 
Competence-enhancing investment augments the MNE’s capabilities by allowing it to tap into 
geographically dispersed knowledge (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2001; Chen, Chen, & Ku, 
2004). Hence, the key considerations when choosing locations for MNE competence-enhancing 



































































investments include access to knowledge workers, knowledge sharing and collaboration among 
employees, and the protection of intellectual property.  
A nation’s supply of knowledge workers depends significantly on its investment in 
education and the ability of graduates to find suitable employment. As income inequality 
increases, education becomes less obtainable as governments increasingly serve a narrower elite 
(Barnard, 2008; OECD, 2015). As a result, there is less availability of knowledge workers to 
staff competence-enhancing subsidiaries. Knowledge workers, being in greater demand as a 
result, have higher bargaining power in wage negotiations, increasing the MNE’s talent search 
and retaining costs. Even when a subsidiary is able to initially source knowledge workers, high 
inequality locations are unlikely to continuously supply such workers over time. The reason for 
this is twofold: first, rising inequality leaves lower-income workers with costly options for 
improving their skills and education, thus they are less likely to make such investments (OECD, 
2015). Second, children from lower-income families spend less time in education than their 
wealthier counterparts, therefore developing subpar numeracy and literacy skills, and limiting 
their career opportunities (OECD, 2013). 
Subsidiaries with a competence-enhancing mandate must also create productive 
relationships with local sources of knowledge and pockets of expertise in both private and public 
institutions. In higher inequality societies, which are more prone to fractious socio-political 
environments (Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Uslaner, 2008) and low levels of trust among economic 
actors (Oishi & Kesebir, 2015), MNEs find it harder to become more socially embedded, 
inhibiting their ability to absorb local knowledge from research institutes and business partners 
(Heidenreich, 2012). These complications tend to hinder competency-seeking subsidiaries’ 



































































efforts to create new knowledge and enhance their capabilities, thus lowering their return from 
invested assets. 
Finally, the greater need to protect MNEs’ proprietary knowledge in higher inequality 
countries increases operating costs (Oxley, 1999). Higher levels of income inequality heighten 
the probability of political unrest, thus increasing the uncertainty surrounding the development of 
economic policies, the rule of law, and the protection of property rights (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; 
Easterly, Ritze, & Woolcock, 2006). Higher inequality is also associated with a greater 
propensity by enfranchised members of the population to hoard valuable assets (Persson & 
Tabellini, 1994). Conversely, disenfranchised subsidiary employees may be more motivated to 
share proprietary information with competitors for personal gains. While this increases the risk 
of MNE investments in general, it is more salient, and hence costlier, in the case of competence-
enhancing subsidiaries. 
Significantly curtailing the potential benefits of efficiency gains, the increased costs 
(mitigating lack of trust, socio-political instability, and limited availability of knowledge 
workers) and risk (expropriation and proprietary knowledge leaking) associated with increased 
income inequality are more salient to investments with a competence-enhancing mandate than 
the other types of investment. We therefore expect a weaker inverted U-shaped relationship 
between income inequality and production entry, where there will be less increase in location 
attractiveness with increases in inequality, in turn resulting in a lower inflection point. Hence, we 
posit: 
 



































































Hypothesis 3: The relationship between a host country’s income inequality and 
the probability of MNE production entry will attenuate when the new subsidiary 
has a competence-enhancing mandate. 
 
Market-seeking objective. Market-seeking investment expands the MNE’s customer base 
by exploiting firm-specific production assets, economies of scale, and market power (Dunning, 
2000). Factors influencing the location choice for market-seeking investments include, first and 
foremost, the availability of large, affluent market segments and the level of economic 
development of the host country (Lei & Chen, 2011; Makino et al., 2002). Hence, increasing 
labor productivity and reducing labor cost become secondary objectives to new revenue 
generation.  
As income inequality increases, social conflict in conjunction with socio-political 
instability often impedes economic development (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Alesina & Rodrik, 
1994; Oetzel, 2005). As a result, the diminished market potential significantly offsets potential 
economizing opportunities from higher income inequality (as in the case of efficiency-seeking 
subsidiaries), making the location less attractive for market-seeking investments (Rodrik, 1999). 
In addition to CSOs and employees, production subsidiaries with market-seeking mandates must 
engage closely with customers, suppliers, and distributors in the local economy, thus increasing 
the interfaces in which bargaining situations arise (Hakkala et al., 2008). In higher inequality 
environments, where it is more difficult to build trusting relationships with institutional actors, 
the market-seeking MNE needs to allocate more resources to building political connections to 
gain access to the local market (Boddewyn, 1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Knack & Keefer, 
1997). Hence, market-seeking subsidiaries are more vulnerable to socio-political instability. 



































































Scholars argue that such instability could potentially result in overt political actions (Keefer & 
Knack, 2002; Oetzel, 2005), unrest, and violence (Fowles & Merva, 1996; Jayadev & Bowles, 
2006), increasing the cost associated with safeguarding the subsidiary’s assets and personnel 
(Rivera-Santos et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, as inequality increases, so do shadow economies, which are comprised of 
unrecorded transactions for legal and illegal goods and services (Dell'Anno, 2016). Citizens are 
more willing to engage in shadow transactions to supplement their livelihood, reduce their 
taxable income, and increase their standard of living, as the formal institutional systems appear 
rigged against them (Uslaner & Brown, 2005). Given that shadow economies are not transparent, 
they are more difficult to understand and thus costlier to compete within, especially for MNEs, 
which tend to exhibit a liability of foreignness.  
Limited market potential and socio-political instability associated with increasing income 
inequality are thus especially salient impediments to achieving the objectives of market-seeking 
subsidiaries, offsetting the benefits arising from labor cost economizing. We therefore expect a 
weaker relationship between income inequality and production entry in the case of market-
seeking investment, where there will be a lower rate of increase in location attractiveness as 
inequality increases, culminating in a lower inflection point. Hence, we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The relationship between a host country’s income inequality and 
the probability of MNE production entry will attenuate when the new subsidiary 
has a market-seeking mandate.  
 
Method 



































































Data and Sample 
To test our theoretical model, we used data compiled by Toyo Keizai in its annual publication, 
Kaigai Shinshutsu Kigyou Souran (Japanese Overseas Investment). This database provides 
detailed information – including host country, industry classification, founding year, and parent 
firms – on nearly all foreign subsidiaries established by Japanese firms. It also provides unique 
information on investment objectives for individual subsidiaries. Our sample includes all 
production subsidiaries established by Japanese parent firms between 1986 and 2012. We use the 
1986–2012 data period for two main reasons. First, Japan has been a leading source of outward 
FDI in the world following the signing of the Plaza Accord in September 1985 (Yamawaki, 
2007). Second, we do not have comprehensive data on subsidiaries established in earlier years, 
which may result in bias towards subsidiaries that survived. In addition, the latest edition of the 




Our unit of analysis is a production entry to a potential host country in a given year. For each 
firm-year-country observation, the binary dependent variable – Entry – takes on the value of one 
when an MNE established a production subsidiary in the country, and the value of zero 
otherwise. 
 
Independent Variables  
The main independent variable, Income Inequality, is measured as the Gini index of inequality in 
equivalized household disposable income drawn from the Standardized World Income Inequality 



































































Database (SWIID) version 5.0 (Solt, 2009). The SWIID combines information from a number of 
prevalent databases on income inequality, including the United Nations University World 
Income Inequality Database (WIID) and the Luxembourg Income Study data (LIS). As a result, 
the SWIID offers more country-year observations than any other income inequality dataset. 
Since its coverage and comparability far exceed those of the alternatives, the SWIID is 
considered best suited for international research on income inequality, compared to other sources 
(Solt, 2009). 
We measure investment objectives using unique data on self-reported, subsidiary-specific 
investment objectives drawn from the Japanese Overseas Investment dataset. We selected 
investment objectives identified by the extant literature as manifesting underlying investment 
strategies to operationalize subsidiary strategic mandates (Caves, 2007; Dunning & Lundan, 
2008). Four self-reported objectives are pertinent to efficiency-seeking investment: “access labor 
force” (Efficiency-Seeking, Labor), “development of overseas production network” (Efficiency-
Seeking, Production Network), “export to third countries” (Efficiency-Seeking, Export Others), 
and “reverse imports to Japan” (Efficiency-Seeking, Export Japan). Investments motivated by 
these objectives allow the firm to gain efficiency through increasing specialization, economies of 
scale, and labor arbitrage (Dunning & Lundan, 2008). Market-Seeking is measured by one self-
reported objective: “access local market”. Competence-Enhancing is measured by examining 
another objective: “development of products and planning”.  
The objective variables are set at one when a specific objective is reported and zero 
otherwise. We record investment objectives reported in the first three years that each subsidiary 
appeared in the dataset, to capture the strategic mandates initially motivating the entry. Fifty-nine 
percent of production subsidiaries in the sample did not report any investment objectives. Since 



































































missing information on investment objectives cannot be treated as absence of intent, we exclude 
these subsidiaries from those models that include objective variables. Although an overall 41-
percent response rate is generally considered reasonable, caution is warranted when one 
considers the broader implications of our results. 
 
Control Variables 
We control for country-level factors that may influence the firms’ location choices. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) and GDP Growth, drawn from the Penn World Table, are used as 
proxies for market size and potential (Caves, 2007). GDP Growth is measured as the average 
annual growth in real GDP in the preceding three-year period. We include GDP per Capita as a 
measure of a country’s degree of prosperity, as well as a proxy for overall labor costs
1
 (Mayer, 
Mejean, & Nefussi, 2010), and Population as a proxy for general labor supply. Drawing on data 
from the World Trade Organization (WTO), we measure Trade Ratio as the ratio of a country’s 
total exports and imports to its GDP, which reflects a country’s level of integration into the 
global economy. We also include FDI Stock, using data from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), to capture the country’s general attractiveness to foreign 
investors.  
We include three variables to control for a host country’s institutional environment. We 
control for the influence of Cultural Distance on FDI using Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
(Hofstede, 2001). We also draw on the POLCON database to create the variable Policy Stability 
to measure the stability of government policies (Henisz, 2002). Rule of Law is drawn from the 
governance indicators developed by Kaufmann et al. (2008). For the missing data years, we 
interpolate using the closest year for which data are available. We also include Geographic 



































































Distance, measured as the distance in thousands of kilometers between Tokyo and a host 
country’s most populated city.  
We include Prior Production Investment and Prior Trading Investment, which are 
respectively measured as the logged count of a firm’s prior production and trading entries into a 
host country, to account for the firms’ propensity to repeatedly enter the same country (Chang, 
1995)
2
. We also include Prior Industry Investment, measured as the logged count of production 
entries into a country by other Japanese firms in the same industry, to control for the influence of 
other firms’ investments on a focal firm’s entry decision (Jiang, Holburn, & Beamish, 2014).  
 
Estimation Approach 
Our analysis employs mixed logit models, which provide a flexible way to examine patterns in 
discrete choices such as investment locations. A generalized version of the conditional logit 
model, the mixed logit model, allows for random preference variation, unrestricted substitution 
patterns, and correlation in unobserved factors over time (Train, 2009). The mixed logit model 
specifies the unobserved portion of utility as a combination of an independent and identically 
distributed (iid) extreme value error term and a randomly distributed component that reflects 
variation in choosers’ preferences. Thus, a researcher can specify some coefficients to be fixed in 
the population, as in a conditional logit model, and others to vary across choice sets in order to 
capture heterogeneity in the decision maker’s preferences.  
In our study, the coefficient for Income Inequality is set to vary across entry decisions 
because we expect its influence to vary depending on investment objectives. Because of this 
unique specification, the output of mixed logit models consists of parameters that characterize 
the distribution of the mean of the randomized coefficient and the distribution of the standard 



































































deviation of the mean preference. More specifically, a statistically significant mean estimate 
suggests that cross-country income inequality influences entry decisions, and a statistically 
significant estimated standard deviation indicates that this influence varies across investments.  
We further include the products of Income Inequality and binary investment objective 
variables to analyze the preference heterogeneity in the effect of Income Inequality that is 
attributable to investment objective (Revelt & Train, 1998). For instance, a statistically 
significant coefficient estimate for the interaction term Income Inequality * Efficiency-Seeking 
(Labor) would indicate heterogeneity in firms’ response to income inequality around that 
specific investment objective. Since the investment objective variables do not vary within choice 
sets, they will appear only as a part of the interaction terms but not as standalone regressors. In 
addition, the mixed logit model is especially useful in controlling the correlation resulting from 
the making of repeated choices by the same firm, which occurs in our data (Revelt & Train, 
1998). We follow prior studies by approximating the choice probability through simulation and 
maximizing the simulated log-likelihood function. Simulations were performed using 100 Halton 
draws (Revelt & Train, 1998). Increasing the number of draws did not lead to material changes 
in the parameter estimates. 
Our final sample includes 14,031 production entries out of a total 1,078,931 firm-year-
country observations when investment objective variables are excluded from a specification. The 
numbers of observations and entries decrease to 448,310 and 5,946, respectively, when 
investment objective variables are included in a specification. Table 1 reports the frequencies of 
occurrence of various investment objectives. These data suggests that firms may pursue multiple 
objectives when establishing a foreign production subsidiary. For example, a subsidiary can 
simultaneously seek to access local labor and pursue local market opportunities. There is little 



































































theoretical guidance in the literature to help determine when one objective may supersede the 
other. We thus allow a subsidiary to be associated with multiple investment objectives, and 
model the interaction effects between Income Inequality and various objective variables 
separately. This approach avoids arbitrarily creating conceptually distinct subsidiary categories 
without sufficient theoretical justification. We center Income Inequality before entering it into 
interaction terms to mitigate potential multicollinearity. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------ 
Results 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics and the correlations of the variables. Table 3 presents the 
results of the mixed logit models. Model 1 is the benchmark specification that includes the linear 
effect of income inequality but contains no interaction terms, which are introduced to Models 2-
9. The coefficient for Income Inequality in Model 1 is positive and statistically significant 
(p<0.01). What is equally informative is the statistically significant estimated standard deviation 
of the coefficient (p<0.01), which indicates that the positive effect of Income Inequality varies 
across investments. This result confirms that it is necessary to explore boundary conditions – 
including investment objective – that may lead to variation in the effect of income inequality.  
---------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 & 3 about here 
---------------------------- 
Hypothesis 1 proposes that income inequality has an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
production entry. To test this hypothesis, we include a quadratic term – Income Inequality 



































































Square – in Model 2. The coefficient estimate for the quadratic term is negative and statistically 
significant (p<0.01), suggesting that the positive effect of Income Inequality decreases at higher 
levels of income inequality. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported. Further analysis indicates that 
inflection occurs around Gini=47.6, with 12 countries above the inflection point and 60 below. 
Host countries that had this level of income inequality in the 2000s include Mexico, Zambia, and 
Panama. When a host country’s Gini index exceeds this level, the positive effect of inequality on 
production entry begins to decrease. Countries falling into this category in the 2000s include 
Angola, Honduras, Peru, and Colombia. 
To illustrate the implications of this finding, we consider the case of China, one of the 
primary destinations for Japanese outward FDI during the study period. The Gini index of this 
country has steadily increased from 30.0 to 33.5 in late 1980s to about 53.5 in early 2010s.  
Hence, China’s inequality was rising along with FDI until it reached and exceeded the inflection 
point (in 2002) based on our sample of Japanese production entries.  Our results imply that China 
could have attracted more investment in recent years if inequality remained at the level of 2002. 
In recent years the Chinese government has listed reducing inequality as a policy priority 
(Zhuang, 2016). We speculate that if the Chinese government and the society in general fail to 
address this issue, foreign investment may begin to dwindle and lead to a more closed market 
economy. 
Over the same period, inequality in the US has risen from about 33.0 in late 1980s to 
around 37.5 in early 2010s. While this is moderate among all countries worldwide, inequality in 
the US is high compared to other developed democracies. Our results predict that the US will 
continue to be a popular destination for FDI as inequality rises, while at the same time 
developing an increasingly fractious society, a process that is already fairly evident in the current 



































































day (Chin, 2017). These observations, of course, are only valid while holding all other factors 
constant. Labor productivity, talent pool size and depth, and market attractiveness all provide 
strong countervailing forces to that of income inequality on location attractiveness. 
Hypothesis 2 proposes that the inverted U-shaped relationship between income inequality 
and production entry will be stronger when the new subsidiary has an efficiency-seeking 
mandate. The interaction terms between efficiency-seeking mandate variables and Income 
Inequality and Income Inequality Square are introduced to Models 3-6 to test the hypothesis. The 
coefficient estimates for the interaction terms between investment purposes and Income 
Inequality are all positive and statistically significant. The coefficient estimates for the 
interaction terms between investment purposes and Income Inequality Square are all negative 
and statistically significant, except for the coefficient estimate for Income Inequality Square * 
Efficiency-Seeking (Production Network), which is signed as expected but statistically non-
significant. Overall, the results suggest that an efficiency-seeking objective accentuates the 
inverted U-shaped effect of income inequality on production entry in that it enhances the positive 
effect in the lower range of income inequality, thus leading to a steeper upward curvature, and 
precipitates the decline in entry probability in the higher range of income inequality. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 is supported.  
We further illustrate the moderation effect in Figure 1 using Efficiency-Seeking (Labor) 
as an example. The diagrams in the left column contrast the simulated probabilities of production 
entry when the labor-seeking objective is missing and present. Since simulation draws repeatedly 
from the distributions of estimated parameters, each inequality value corresponds to more than 
one simulated entry probability, thus the width of the curve. When Efficiency-Seeking (Labor) is 
equal to one, the upper curvature becomes steeper than when the variable is set to zero, and the 



































































inflection point shifts rightward. The differences in the shape of the two curves are consistent 
with coefficient estimates reported in Table 2. 
Hypothesis 3 proposes that the relationship between income inequality and production 
entry will be weaker in the case of a competence-enhancing mandate. To test this hypothesis, we 
include the term Income Inequality * Competence-Enhancing and Income Inequality Square * 
Market-Seeking in Model 7. The coefficient estimates for both interaction terms are signed as 
expected and statistically significant. The results indicate that a competence-enhancing purpose 
reduces the positive effect in the lower range of income inequality, resulting in a flatter upward 
curvature, and attenuates the decline in entry probability in the higher range of income 
inequality, thus supporting the hypothesis. The diagrams in the central column in Figure 1 further 
demonstrate the moderation effect, where the inflection point shifts leftward significantly, the 
peak values are smaller, and the inverted U-shaped curve is significantly flatter when 
Competence-Enhancing is set to one. 
Finally, Hypothesis 4 suggests that a market-seeking mandate will weaken the 
relationship between income inequality and production entry. The coefficient estimates for the 
interaction terms Income Inequality * Market-Seeking and Income Inequality Square * Market-
Seeking in Model 8 are both statistically significant and signed as expected. Additional graphic 
analysis (the diagrams in the right column in Figure 1) further verifies this result, showing that 
the peak values at the inflection point are smaller and that the inverted U-shaped curve is 
significantly flatter. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is strongly supported.  
Estimation results for GDP, GDP Growth, and Population indicate that Japanese firms 
are more likely to enter countries with a larger market size and a higher economic growth rate. 
However, GDP per Capita does not significantly affect entry decisions. Trade Ratio is 



































































negatively related to production investment, possibly because trade barriers have a substitution 
effect on FDI (Markusen, 1995). We found FDI Stock to be negatively related to production 
entry. This result reflects the fact that countries with high levels of FDI stock are mostly 
developed countries, which tend to import manufactured goods from less developed countries. A 
large Geographic Distance between Japan and a potential host country deters production 
investment. In contrast, Rule of Law has a positive effect on production entry. However, the 
impact of Policy Stability appears to be negative, and Cultural Distance is positively related to 
entry decisions. The somewhat unexpected results on Policy Stability and Cultural Distance may 
reflect the fact that most entries in our sample occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s, when many 
of the sampled firms had overcome the initial institutional barriers through their previous 
investments in the 1970s and early 1980s. As we expected, prior entries into a host country by a 
focal firm and its industry peers strongly influence the firm’s propensity to enter the same 
country. 
 
Robustness of Findings 
We conduct additional analyses to examine the robustness of our results to alternative sampling 
and estimation approaches. Table 4 reports the results of these analyses. First, we estimate a 
conditional logit model, which is a commonly used method in the location choice literature, for 
our sample. Since the conditional logit model does not accommodate chooser-specific attributes 
(i.e. investment objectives), we can only estimate the effects of Income Inequality and its 
quadratic term. The estimation results (Models 9 and 10) are highly consistent with those from 









































































Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------ 
In addition, China received a large number of production investments during the study 
period (35 percent of all entries)
4
. To ensure that our results are not disproportionately driven by 
the idiosyncrasies of one host country, we re-estimate our model on a modified sample that 
excludes China from the country choice set (Models 11-18). The coefficient estimates in terms of 
theoretical interest in these models are consistent with those reported in Models 1-8, confirming 
the reliability of our findings. We also exclude small subsidiaries with fewer than 20 employees 
to ensure that our results reflect the locational patterns of investment with economic significance 






Our study contributes to inequality research by providing evidence on how MNEs respond to 
national differences in income inequality when making location decisions. While increasing 
income inequality contributes to societal ills, including declining trust in business and 
institutions and socio-political instability, in the short term it can also provide MNEs with easier 
and cheaper access to labor while reducing CSOs’ engagement, which typically increases costs. 
Therefore, at low levels of inequality, location attractiveness increases with income inequality. 
However, as inequality reaches higher levels, the cost-economizing opportunities previously 
observed are increasingly offset by the higher cost associated with an unstable socio-political 
environment, and by reduced trust and cooperation among institutional actors. Furthermore, 



































































actions taken by the state to reduce inequality, through taxation and redistribution, also increase 
the cost incurred by the production subsidiary, thus reducing location attractiveness. 
We undertook this study to complement macroeconomic studies on income inequality by 
examining its effect in the context of organizations (Morris & Western, 1999) and its influence 
on management decision-making (Marens, 2018). To achieve this, we focused on a particularly 
consequential decision – investment location choice – made by transnational organizations. We 
then embedded the motives of these companies into the location decision by examining the 
impact of varying degrees of inequality on the cost efficiency with which those objectives may 
be achieved. Cobb (2016) and Lewellyn (2018) argue that broader institutional forces, most 
notably the relative influence of capital-based financial systems, induce corporations to engage 
in compensation practices that contribute to income inequality. Our approach builds upon this 
institutional lens, and acknowledges the co-evolutionary nature of the organization and its 
environment in which each shapes the other (Alamgir & Cairns, 2015; Beal & Astakhova, 2017; 
Davis, 2017). What this means, in the context of the current study, is that among the many 
criteria for MNE location decisions, income inequality appears to have some effects that have 
been previously overlooked. While the impact of many of the stakeholders (unions, 
governments, and CSOs) have been identified by international business scholars as affecting 
location attractiveness (Flores & Aguilera, 2007; Jain, Kothari, & Kumar, 2016), our research 
sheds light on the offsetting mechanisms through which the cost associated with these 
institutional actors alters a location’s attractiveness.  
Davis (2013) predicts the demise of the traditional joint-stock corporation due to its 
declining social functions (job provision, retirement security provisioning, acting as a vehicle for 
savings). However, the results of our study suggest that the MNE may extend the organizational 



































































life cycle of corporations by disaggregating supply chain segments of varying fit to different 
institutional environments. As MNEs enter these new geographically distributed institutional 
spaces, they will inevitably shift the course of their evolution. Given the association between 
income inequality and location attractiveness, our findings suggest that higher levels of 
inequality are more attractive to foreign production investments that prioritize cost efficiency. 
These investments may actually reduce inequality by increasing host country employment and 
potentially raising wage levels, especially at the lower end of the income distribution (Park, 
2017). 
Our research provides empirical evidence to support the effect of income inequality on 
firm behavior, as postulated by Beal & Astakhova (2017), with a focus on discrete FDI location 
decisions. While the current study does not examine the eventual impact of FDI on inequality, it 
does offer insights that are useful for extending the existing discussion on this subject. The 
majority of the research investigating the relationship between FDI and income inequality has 
ignored the specific goals of individual MNEs (Lin, Kim, & Wu, 2013; Wu & Hsu, 2012). Our 
study highlights their motivations and economic interests in our theoretical formulation. Future 
research can use this finding to support research on how aggregate FDI may influence the 
trajectory of within- or between-country income inequalities. While research has already been 
conducted in this area, its findings are mixed (Halmos, 2011; Herzer, Hühne, & Nunnenkamp, 
2014) and context-dependent (Deng & Lin, 2013). Future research could examine how the 
prevalence of different motives for FDI can provide guidance to policy makers interested in both 
creating and allocating value. While it is beyond the scope of this study, we suggest that further 
research needs to be conducted with a more refined lens, inclusive of these motives, on how FDI 
influences inequality.  



































































Finally, the empirical scope of this study is quite broad, in the sense that numerous 
countries (87), each with their own macroeconomic, political, and institutional characteristics, 
have been considered as alternate potential locations for investment. We thus overcome the issue 
of reduced country representation, which has been highlighted as a potential threat to the 
generalizability of research on inequality (Beramendi & Rueda, 2014). Our study was undertaken 
to specifically motivate such research, as the current organization/inequality research nexus is 
more focused on how inequality within an organization impacts its processes, and how income 
inequality within a society impacts the legitimacy of various organizational forms (Bapuji, 
2015). In this sense, our findings underscore the usefulness of the governance triangles 
framework, which identifies private firms, CSOs, and policy makers as fundamental forces that 
shape regulation and economic behavior globally (Abbott, 2012). Although MNEs can enact 
significant global influence, they are often limited in their efforts to tackle global issues due to 
their primary concerns for remaining competitive, especially the need to continually enhance 
efficiency. Meanwhile, the scope of governments’ influence is defined by sovereignty 
boundaries, and CSOs typically have fewer resources to enact their interests. As with other major 
global problems (Abbott, 2012), inequality and its consequences can only be dealt with 
effectively through concerted interaction between all three sets of actors. 
 
Limitations and Future Avenues for Research 
Our findings must be considered within the limitations of the study, which in turn should be 
addressed in future research. First, lack of data availability prevents us from examining the issue 
of subnational variations in income inequality, which is salient in such large and diverse 
economies as China and the United States. A finer-grained analysis of the relationship between 



































































income inequality and MNE investment at a subnational level has the potential to reveal more 
nuanced effects of inequality, because the investment environment is otherwise more 
homogeneous.  
The generalizability of our findings could be limited by the fact that our sample includes 
Japanese MNEs only, although these MNEs have been found to be a suitable basis for a great 
number and variety of MNE studies (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Delios & Henisz, 2003; Head et 
al., 1995; Hennart & Park, 1994). Firms’ responses to host country income inequality could be 
conditioned by the home country’s dominant institutional view of inequality (Holburn & Zelner, 
2010). There is evidence that individuals acculturated to a high level of power distance tend to be 
more tolerant of inequality (Craig, Douglas, & Grein, 1992; Daniels & Greguras, 2014). For 
example, Andrews and Htun (2018) found that cultural orientation moderates the negative effects 
of inequality (e.g. lack of trust) within the organization. Given that Japanese managers tend to 
accept moderate levels of power distance (Hofstede, 2001), the costs associated with inequality 
in locations with similar, or lower, levels of power distance may seem more acceptable, hence 
introducing bias towards such locations. Furthermore, Japanese firms are characterized by high 
levels of institutional ownership (i.e. banks and keiretsu members). While large block ownership 
can improve monitoring (Li, 1994), extensive use of interlocking directorates can also lead to 
excessive risk-taking (Buckley & Strange, 2011). It would therefore be fruitful to use a sample of 
firms from different home countries to further test and refine the role of culture in our theoretical 
model. A multi-home-country design would be particularly useful to reveal how the difference in 
inequality between home and host countries influences MNE geographic expansion.  
Future research could consider the extent to which our results depend on the type of 
inequality (i.e. income, wealth, social, etc.). Social inequality can, for example, be attributed to 



































































gender, racial, familial, or tribal classifications, and these divisions are often reflected in income 
differences (Kilgour, 2012; Smith, 2002). Inequality may incite less political unrest when based 
on some demographic differences and not others, and thus not significantly diminish location 
attractiveness. On the other hand, social divisions based on family, race, or tribal affiliations are 
more likely to create heightened political pressures, which may escalate in violence. Hence, the 
effect of inequality on location attractiveness is probably more nuanced than the higher-level 
evidence provided. Future research should also investigate how other aspects of foreign 
investment decision-making are likely to be influenced by national income inequality. In 
particular, researchers should examine how different modes of entry (i.e. joint ventures versus 
wholly owned subsidiaries, acquisitions versus greenfield, etc.) may be selected based on the 
level of inequality within the nation or region, and how the choices of investment location and 
entry mode impact subsidiary and overall firm performance.  
 
Conclusion 
We aimed to start a discussion on the role of MNEs in responding to and potentially shaping 
income inequality. We established the existence of a relationship between income inequality and 
location choice, which is dependent upon the investment objectives of the MNE. Policy makers 
can use our results to make more informed decisions about FDI policy by taking into account the 
objectives of the MNE (Herrera-Echeverri, Haar, & Estevez-Breton, 2014). Moreover, the state’s 
desire to improve economic conditions through FDI is unlikely to have the desired impact 
without first understanding the full implications of the firms’ preferences. Similarly, policies 
designed to ameliorate the undesirable social effects of inequality may be incomplete, 



































































ineffective, or much more difficult to achieve if the economic implications and organizational 
perspectives on income inequality are ignored.  
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1. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting we include wage in our models. 
Drawing on the labor costs data published by the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
we ran an additional model with this variable specified. The sample size declined by 
approximately 65 percent due to the temporal and geographic constraints of the ILO data; 
the number of host countries also decreased, from 87 to 69. The results were largely 
consistent with those reported in Table 3 and, since GDP per capita is a widely accepted 
proxy for compensation, we chose to exclude wage from our final model. 
2. A diagnostic analysis indicates that the count variables of prior entries are skewed, hence 
the logarithm transformation. 
3. Since the conditional logit model is a fixed-effects model, the variance of coefficient 
estimates is not available. 
4. Our sample includes entries into 87 host countries. Other leading recipients of Japanese 
foreign production investment are, in descending order: the United States, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, Hong Kong, the Philippines, 
Singapore, the United Kingdom, India, France, and Germany. Each of these countries 
accounted for more than 1 percent of the total entries during the study period. 
5. Exhibits were omitted due to space constraints.  
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Table 1. Entries by Investment Objective. 
Self-reported investment objectives Count 
Efficiency-Seeking  
Efficiency-Seeking (Labor) 2,047 
Efficiency-Seeking (Production Network) 3,956 
Efficiency-Seeking (Export Others) 759 








































































Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations. 
Variables Mean S. D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Entry 0.01 0.11 0 1
2 Income Inequality 37.0 9.49 18.0 62.6 0.024
3 Efficiency-Seeking (Labor) 0.34 0.47 0 1 0.000 -0.002
4 Efficiency-Seeking (Production Network) 0.68 0.47 0 1 -0.003 0.014 0.080
5 Efficiency-Seeking (Export Others) 0.13 0.33 0 1 0.001 -0.004 0.160 0.031
6 Efficiency-Seeking (Export Japan) 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.000 -0.003 0.258 0.045 0.180
7 Market-Seeking 0.64 0.48 0 1 0.000 -0.001 -0.025 -0.082 0.039 -0.081
8 Competence-Enhancing 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.000 0.000 -0.075 -0.012 -0.014 -0.016 -0.031
9 GDP 0.49 1.29 0.00 13.2 0.236 -0.010 -0.008 0.011 -0.006 -0.011 -0.005 0.000
10 GDP Growth 0.04 0.06 -0.31 0.74 0.051 0.062 -0.011 0.012 -0.007 -0.025 -0.008 -0.003 0.004
11 GDP per capita 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.014 -0.564 -0.019 0.030 -0.015 -0.026 -0.011 0.001 0.253 -0.019
12 Population 0.06 0.17 0.00 1.32 0.303 0.126 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.521 0.080
13 Trade Ratio 0.57 1.92 0.03 23.0 -0.017 -0.160 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 -0.059 0.053
14 FDI Stock 0.07 0.23 0.00 3.55 0.067 -0.066 -0.024 0.031 -0.018 -0.033 -0.014 0.002 0.751 -0.028
15 Geographic Distance 9.86 3.74 1.16 18.6 -0.156 0.418 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.116 -0.078
16 Rule of Law 0.37 0.98 -1.70 2.00 -0.010 -0.646 0.001 -0.013 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.014
17 Policy Stability 0.35 0.19 0 0.72 -0.082 -0.253 -0.006 0.036 -0.008 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.012 -0.003
18 Cultural Distance 3.17 1.68 0.71 8.88 0.018 -0.181 -0.002 0.006 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.069 -0.021
19 Prior Production Investment 0.05 0.22 0 4.03 0.161 0.018 -0.029 0.000 0.001 -0.030 -0.007 -0.004 0.325 0.043
20 Prior Trading Investment 0.03 0.18 0 3.95 0.058 -0.022 -0.020 -0.012 0.005 -0.014 -0.022 0.009 0.224 0.012
21 Piror Industry Investment 0.97 1.37 0 6.81 0.225 -0.033 -0.008 0.017 -0.003 -0.022 0.005 0.008 0.508 0.097
Variables 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
12 Population -0.158
13 Trade Ratio 0.252 -0.076
14 FDI Stock 0.435 0.136 0.009
15 Geographic Distance -0.202 -0.279 -0.046 -0.041
16 Rule of Law 0.819 -0.142 0.198 0.258 -0.221
17 Policy Stability 0.338 -0.161 0.071 0.052 0.148 0.378
18 Cultural Distance 0.167 -0.049 -0.016 -0.008 -0.229 0.238 -0.029
19 Prior Production Investment 0.068 0.217 -0.015 0.210 -0.170 0.049 -0.043 0.012
20 Prior Trading Investment 0.128 0.060 0.000 0.178 -0.073 0.107 -0.006 0.002 0.436
21 Piror Industry Investment 0.260 0.364 -0.019 0.395 -0.421 0.210 -0.023 0.002 0.366 0.239
N=448,310; Correlation with absolute values greater than 0.003 are significant at the p<0.05.



































































Table 3. Mixed Logit Models of Production Entries. 
 
Variables
Income Inequality (mean coefficient) 0.07 ** 0.25 ** 0.01 0.13 ** 0.24 ** 0.19 ** 0.32 ** 0.35 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
(standard deviation 0.17 ** 0.27 ** 0.28 ** 0.3 ** 0.29 ** 0.29 ** 0.29 ** 0.29 **
of coefficient) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Income Inequality Square (mean coefficient) -0.41 ** -0.42 ** -0.49 ** -0.47 ** -0.44 ** -0.51 ** -0.61 **
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05)
(standard deviation 0.21 ** 0.25 ** 0.26 ** 0.26 ** 0.26 ** 0.26 ** 0.25 **
of coefficient) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Income Inequality 0.75 **
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Labor) (0.06)
Income Inequality Square -0.27 **
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Labor) (0.06)
Income Inequality 0.22 **
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Production Network) (0.05)
Income Inequality Square -0.01
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Production Network) (0.05)
Income Inequality 0.14 *
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Export Others) (0.07)
Income Inequality Square -0.17 *
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Export Others) (0.08)
Income Inequality 0.36 **
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Export Japan) (0.06)
Income Inequality Square -0.31 **
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Export Japan) (0.07)
Income Inequality -0.74 **
 *Competence-Enhancing (0.08)
Income Inequality Square 0.17 *
 *Competence-Enhancing (0.08)
Income Inequality -0.12 *
 *Market-Seeking (0.05)
Income Inequality Square 0.19 **
 *Market-Seeking (0.05)
GDP 0.01 0.06 ** 0.09 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP Growth 1.9 ** 2.45 ** 3.29 ** 3.06 ** 3.15 ** 3.14 ** 3.18 ** 3.15 **
(0.27) (0.27) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42)
GDP per capita -1.15 -2.5 -6.96 -3.84 -4.53 -4.8 -5.17 -4.45
(2.72) (2.79) (4.65) (4.68) (4.67) (4.66) (4.66) (4.67)
Population 0.88 ** 0.85 ** 0.72 ** 0.75 ** 0.75 ** 0.75 ** 0.74 ** 0.75 **
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
FDI Stock 0.09 ** -0.24 ** -0.41 ** -0.39 ** -0.39 ** -0.39 ** -0.4 ** -0.39 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Trade Ratio -0.32 ** -0.3 ** -0.33 ** -0.36 ** -0.35 ** -0.35 ** -0.35 ** -0.35 **
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Geographic Distance -0.07 ** -0.08 ** -0.11 ** -0.11 ** -0.11 ** -0.11 ** -0.11 ** -0.11 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cultural Distance 0.05 ** 0.02 † 0.08 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Policy Stability -0.29 ** -0.26 ** -0.22 † -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.20 † -0.19
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Rule of Law 0.09 ** 0.19 ** 0.2 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Prior Production Investment 0.08 ** 0.1 ** 0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.11 ** 0.11 **
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Prior Trading Investment 0.15 ** 0.13 ** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Prior Industry Investment 0.91 ** 0.84 ** 0.88 ** 0.88 ** 0.89 ** 0.89 ** 0.88 ** 0.88 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of Observations
Log-Likelihood 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01.  
Model 6 Model 8Model 7Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
448310 448310448310
-36093.1 -35785.2 -14442.2 -14533.2 -14540.7 -14522.8 -14536.4-14506.5
1078931 1078931 448310 448310 448310



































































Table 4. Robustness Checks (Alternative Specifications). 
 
Variables
Income Inequality (mean coefficient) 0.06 ** 0.21 ** 0.08 ** 0.18 ** -0.04 0.09 † 0.18 ** 0.14 ** 0.25 ** 0.26 **
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
(standard deviation 0.17 ** 0.25 ** 0.25 ** 0.28 ** 0.26 ** 0.27 ** 0.27 ** 0.26 **
of coefficient) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Income Inequality Square (mean coefficient) -0.36 ** -0.27 ** -0.18 ** -0.27 ** -0.26 ** -0.22 ** -0.34 ** -0.44 **
 (0.02)  (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
(standard deviation 0.21 ** 0.16 * 0.17 ** 0.17 ** 0.16 * 0.18 ** 0.16 *
of coefficient) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Income Inequality 0.65 **  
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Labor) (0.05)  
Income Inequality Square -0.37 **  
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Labor) (0.06)  
Income Inequality 0.18 **  
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Production Network) (0.05)  
Income Inequality Square -0.06  
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Production Network) (0.05)  
Income Inequality 0.07  
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Export Others) (0.07)  
Income Inequality Square -0.25 **  
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Export Others) (0.08)  
Income Inequality 0.27 **  
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Export Japan) (0.06)  
Income Inequality Square -0.4 **  
 *Efficiency-Seeking (Export Japan) (0.07)  
Income Inequality -0.73 **
 *Competence-Enhancing (0.09)
Income Inequality Square 0.39 **
 *Competence-Enhancing (0.08)
Income Inequality -0.1 †
 *Market-Seeking (0.05)
Income Inequality Square 0.22 **
 *Market-Seeking (0.05)
GDP 0.00 0.05 ** -0.15 ** -0.06 ** -0.08 ** -0.08 ** -0.08 ** -0.08 ** -0.07 ** -0.08 **
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GDP Growth 1.86 ** 2.39 ** 1.81 ** 1.86 ** 2.62 ** 2.36 ** 2.45 ** 2.43 ** 2.48 ** 2.44 **
(0.27)  (0.27)  (0.28) (0.28) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44) (0.44)
GDP per capita 0.21 0.22 -31.3 ** -24.8 ** -32.1 ** -29 ** -29.9 ** -30 ** -30.3 ** -29.9 **
(2.7)  (2.75)  (3.07) (3.15) (5.25) (5.29) (5.28) (5.27) (5.27) (5.28)
Population 0.89 ** 0.88 ** 1.16 ** 1 ** 0.95 ** 0.96 ** 0.98 ** 0.97 ** 0.95 ** 0.97 **
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
FDI Stock -0.33 ** -0.32 ** 0.99 ** 0.72 ** 0.8 ** 0.78 ** 0.79 ** 0.79 ** 0.78 ** 0.78 **
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.1) (0.11) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Trade Ratio 0.09 ** -0.21 ** -0.26 ** -0.27 ** -0.28 ** -0.31 ** -0.31 ** -0.31 ** -0.3 ** -0.31 **
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Geographic Distance -0.07 ** -0.08 ** -0.1 ** -0.1 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 **
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0) (0) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cultural Distance 0.08 ** 0.17 ** 0.00 -0.01 0.06 ** 0.07 ** 0.07 ** 0.06 ** 0.06 ** 0.07 **
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Policy Stability -0.28 ** -0.24 ** -0.7 ** -0.56 ** -0.58 ** -0.54 ** -0.54 ** -0.54 ** -0.55 ** -0.54 **
(0.07)  (0.08)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Rule of Law 0.05 ** 0.03 * 0.31 ** 0.31 ** 0.33 ** 0.32 ** 0.32 ** 0.33 ** 0.33 ** 0.33 **
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Prior Production Investment 0.08 ** 0.1 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.2 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 ** 0.19 **
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Prior Trading Investment 0.14 ** 0.11 ** 0.1 ** 0.08 * -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Prior Industry Investment 0.9 ** 0.83 ** 0.88 ** 0.85 ** 0.89 ** 0.88 ** 0.89 ** 0.89 ** 0.89 ** 0.88 **
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Number of Observations
Log-Likelihood 
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01.  
-36152.5 -35870.3




Mixed Logit (China excluded)
933727 933727 396375 396375 396375 396375
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
396375396375
-30485.6 -30404.6 -12408.6 -12485.8 -12486.8 -12469.9 -12482.9-12456.1
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Income Inequality (Gini Index)
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